The Strategic Reality Behind Extreme Nuclear Threats Against IRAN

The severe verbal military threats issued by the parties confronting Iran, including the United States and Israel, are largely a form of political and economic propaganda intended to extract the maximum possible benefit and profit. This is because, if these threats were actually put into practice—including a nuclear attack—they would have irreversible consequences and repercussions for the attacking side itself.

The two aforementioned countries confronting Iran are fully aware of the reality of the situation. There is credible evidence that, since the Twelve-Day War and up to the present, the Iranian armed forces have not carried out a maximum-scale offensive attack, even though they possess the capability to go further than what has been demonstrated so far—potentially including a response to an attack on Dimona. This is particularly significant because, during the Twelve-Day War, powerful explosions occurred and were recorded near this nuclear site.

Consequently, in response to a nuclear attack against Iran, the ultimate outcome could be the destruction of the entire State of Israel, as well as surrounding countries, as a result of nuclear explosions. The geographical scale of these countries, including Israel, is negligible compared with the vast territorial scale of Iran—almost comparable, by comparison, to the size of an island.

Therefore, following a nuclear explosion in both countries, it would be Iran that would retain its civilization, while Israel and its neighboring countries would face complete and irreversible destruction.

Finally, let us understand rationally what we are saying before we speak. This is a message directed at those issuing nuclear threats against the Iranian people.

Political Propaganda, Economic Interests, Nuclear Escalation, and Civilizational Consequences

Abstract

The increasingly severe military rhetoric directed against Iran by the United States and Israel must be examined not merely as a declaration of military intent, but as a form of political, strategic, psychological, and economic communication. Extreme verbal threats can serve multiple purposes: generating political leverage, influencing economic conditions, strengthening domestic political narratives, increasing military and security expenditures, influencing financial and energy markets, and extracting the maximum possible strategic benefit without necessarily requiring the threatened action to be carried out.

The central argument of this article is that the practical implementation of such threats—particularly the use of nuclear weapons against Iran—would create consequences of an entirely different magnitude from those associated with conventional military confrontation. A nuclear attack would not constitute an ordinary military operation with predictable and controllable consequences. Rather, it could initiate an escalation whose political, military, environmental, demographic, economic, and civilizational consequences would extend far beyond the original target.

This reality is particularly significant in the context of Iran's demonstrated military restraint. Since the Twelve-Day War, the Iranian armed forces have not, according to the argument developed here, employed the maximum offensive capability potentially available to them. The significance of this restraint becomes even greater when considered alongside the events surrounding the Dimona nuclear site during the Twelve-Day War, when powerful explosions were reported and recorded in its vicinity. Within this strategic framework, the possibility of an extreme Iranian response to an existential attack must be considered as a factor in the calculations of those threatening Iran.

The article further examines the profound geographical asymmetry between Iran and Israel. Iran possesses a vast territorial depth, whereas Israel and several surrounding states occupy comparatively small geographic spaces with concentrated populations and critical infrastructure. Consequently, the consequences of a nuclear exchange would not necessarily be geographically symmetrical. A nuclear attack on Iran could therefore create a chain of retaliation whose consequences for Israel and the surrounding region could be existential.

The fundamental conclusion is a warning concerning strategic responsibility: those who publicly issue nuclear threats against Iran must understand the full implications of the words they use. In the nuclear age, political rhetoric cannot be separated completely from the possibility of catastrophic military consequences. Strategic rationality requires understanding not only what one threatens to do to an adversary, but also what the implementation of that threat could ultimately do to oneself.

Keywords: Iran, Israel, United States, nuclear threats, military propaganda, political economy, strategic deterrence, Twelve-Day War, Dimona, nuclear escalation, geographical asymmetry, civilizational survival, Middle East security

1. Introduction

Military confrontation does not begin with weapons alone.

Before missiles are launched, aircraft take off, or military forces cross borders, states communicate through speeches, warnings, declarations, interviews, military statements, diplomatic messages, intelligence disclosures, and political rhetoric.

In conflicts involving major military powers, these statements can become instruments of strategic warfare in their own right.

The severe verbal threats repeatedly directed against Iran by the United States and Israel therefore deserve to be examined beyond their literal wording.

The central question is not simply whether a particular threat is technically possible.

The more important question is:

Why is the threat being made, what political and economic purposes does it serve, and what would happen if the threatened action were actually implemented?

This question becomes especially serious when the language concerns nuclear weapons.

A nuclear attack is fundamentally different from a conventional military operation. It introduces consequences that cannot necessarily be limited to the intended target, controlled geographically, or reversed politically.

The argument developed in this article is that the extreme military rhetoric directed against Iran frequently has a significant political and economic dimension. Threats can generate strategic leverage without requiring their execution. They can create uncertainty in financial and energy markets, justify military expenditure, strengthen political narratives, influence negotiations, and create opportunities for states and economic actors to obtain strategic or financial advantages.

Yet the existence of these political and economic functions does not make the underlying military dimension irrelevant.

Quite the opposite.

The central paradox is that the more destructive the threatened action becomes, the greater the consequences of actually implementing it may become for the state issuing the threat.

This is particularly true in the case of nuclear warfare.

2. Threats as Instruments of Political and Economic Power

Military threats are rarely addressed exclusively to the enemy.

A single statement can simultaneously address:

• the opposing government;

• the domestic population;

• allies;

• international institutions;

• financial markets;

• energy markets;

• military industries;

• and the broader international public.

Consequently, military rhetoric can have a political economy of its own.

A severe threat against Iran can influence perceptions concerning:

• oil prices;

• energy security;

• shipping;

• insurance;

• military procurement;

• sanctions;

• financial markets;

• regional investment;

• and government expenditure.

This means that the economic consequences of a threat can appear before the military action itself.

A threat does not have to be implemented to produce economic effects.

The mere expectation of possible war can generate financial opportunities and losses.

For this reason, the political economy of military rhetoric deserves independent consideration.

3. The Profit and Strategic-Benefit Dimension

The proposition that military threats can be connected to political and economic benefit should not be understood narrowly as an assertion that every threat is motivated exclusively by financial profit.

Rather, the argument concerns the broader concept of strategic benefit.

A government may benefit from threatening military action by:

• strengthening its negotiating position;

• compelling concessions;

• increasing international pressure on an adversary;

• mobilizing allies;

• justifying military expenditures;

• influencing markets;

• strengthening domestic political support;

• or establishing itself as the dominant security actor in a region.

The threat therefore becomes an instrument.

Its value may lie precisely in the fact that it does not have to be implemented.

The state can obtain political leverage from the possibility of war while avoiding the costs of actually fighting the war.

This is one of the central mechanisms through which military rhetoric becomes a component of political strategy.

4. The Difference Between Threatening War and Fighting War

A crucial distinction must be maintained between:

the political value of a threat

and

the practical consequences of executing that threat.

A state can threaten an adversary because the threat itself produces a desired reaction.

But once the threat is implemented, the situation changes fundamentally.

The attacker becomes exposed to:

• military retaliation;

• economic disruption;

• international diplomatic consequences;

• domestic political costs;

• escalation;

• destruction of infrastructure;

• casualties;

• and potentially uncontrollable consequences.

The cost-benefit calculation therefore changes dramatically between the moment a threat is issued and the moment it is executed.

This distinction is especially important in the case of Iran.

A government considering an attack against Iran cannot reasonably evaluate the operation solely in terms of the damage it expects to inflict.

It must also consider the response.

5. Iran's Strategic Position

Iran occupies an unusual position in the Middle Eastern strategic system.

It possesses:

• substantial geographical depth;

• a large population;

• significant military capabilities;

• extensive missile capabilities;

• major energy resources;

• strategic access to the Persian Gulf;

• and a political and military structure capable of sustaining prolonged confrontation.

These characteristics make Iran fundamentally different from a small state whose strategic vulnerability is concentrated within a limited geographical area.

An attacker therefore faces a complex problem.

Destroying individual targets does not necessarily mean eliminating the adversary's capacity for retaliation.

Nor does damaging infrastructure necessarily mean eliminating the political entity itself.

The existence of territorial depth changes the strategic calculation.

6. The Significance of Iranian Restraint

One of the central propositions of this article is that Iran has demonstrated a degree of military restraint.

The significance of this argument lies not simply in what Iran has done, but in what it has not done.

Since the Twelve-Day War, the argument holds, Iran has not employed its maximum conceivable offensive capability against its adversaries.

This distinction is strategically important.

Military restraint can itself constitute a form of strategic communication.

A state may demonstrate that it possesses capabilities while deliberately stopping short of the maximum level of escalation.

The message can be interpreted as:

The capabilities that have been demonstrated should not necessarily be mistaken for the full extent of what could theoretically be employed under circumstances considered existential.

Such restraint can function as deterrence.

It communicates capability without necessarily crossing the threshold into unlimited escalation.

7. The Twelve-Day War as Evidence of the Strategic Threshold

The Twelve-Day War provides the central contemporary context for this argument.

The conflict demonstrated that direct military confrontation between Iran and Israel could occur at an unprecedented level.

It also demonstrated that the United States could become directly involved in attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Yet despite the intensity of the conflict, the confrontation did not develop into an unrestricted nuclear war.

This is strategically significant.

It indicates that even during a period of direct military confrontation, limits existed.

Those limits may have reflected:

• strategic calculations;

• concern about escalation;

• deterrence;

• political considerations;

• military constraints;

• or the recognition that unlimited escalation could produce catastrophic consequences.

Whatever the precise combination of motivations, the absence of nuclear escalation itself constitutes an important feature of the conflict.

8. Dimona and the Strategic Meaning of Nuclear Vulnerability

The Dimona site occupies a unique position in discussions of Israel's nuclear capability.

Israel maintains a policy of nuclear ambiguity and does not officially acknowledge possession of nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, Israel is widely assessed internationally as possessing a nuclear arsenal.

The location of the country's nuclear research infrastructure in the Negev therefore has considerable strategic significance.

During the Twelve-Day War, powerful explosions were reported and recorded in the vicinity of the Dimona site.

Within the argument advanced here, these events are significant because they demonstrate that the geographical environment surrounding a strategically important nuclear site can become exposed during a direct Iran-Israel conflict.

The broader strategic implication is more important than the precise interpretation of any individual explosion:

Once military confrontation reaches the geographic vicinity of nuclear infrastructure, the possibility of uncontrolled escalation becomes substantially more serious.

A conflict involving nuclear-related sites cannot be treated as an ordinary conventional confrontation.

9. The Nuclear Threshold

The possibility of a nuclear attack against Iran represents a fundamental threshold.

Once nuclear weapons are introduced, the nature of the conflict changes.

The consequences can include:

• immediate mass casualties;

• destruction of infrastructure;

• radiation exposure;

• radioactive contamination;

• disruption of government;

• displacement of populations;

• environmental consequences;

• economic collapse;

• and retaliatory escalation.

The political objective that motivated the initial attack can rapidly become secondary.

The conflict becomes a question of survival.

This is why nuclear threats are fundamentally different from conventional military threats.

10. The Attacker Cannot Control All Consequences

One of the most important strategic realities of nuclear warfare is the difficulty of controlling consequences after nuclear weapons have been used.

A state may select a specific target.

But it cannot necessarily determine:

• the exact distribution of fallout;

• atmospheric movement;

• secondary fires;

• infrastructure collapse;

• population movement;

• retaliatory decisions;

• international reactions;

• or subsequent military escalation.

The distinction between intended consequences and actual consequences therefore becomes enormous.

This is one reason nuclear warfare creates such powerful deterrence dynamics.

11. The Iranian Response to an Existential Attack

The strategic calculation changes fundamentally if Iran is subjected to an attack that it perceives as existential.

A government facing the destruction of critical national infrastructure may no longer operate according to the same restraint that characterized an earlier stage of conflict.

This is the central logic underlying the argument about Iranian military restraint.

If restraint is interpreted as a deliberate political and strategic choice rather than a lack of capability, then threatening Iran with existential destruction creates a dangerous assumption:

The assumption that the level of Iranian response will remain permanently limited regardless of the severity of the attack.

Such an assumption may prove strategically dangerous.

12. From Conventional Escalation to Nuclear Escalation

The danger is therefore not merely that Iran could respond militarily.

The more serious possibility is that an attack could create an escalation sequence.

A hypothetical sequence could develop as follows:

Stage One: severe military threat;

Stage Two: conventional attack;

Stage Three: Iranian retaliation;

Stage Four: expansion of targets;

Stage Five: attacks against strategically sensitive infrastructure;

Stage Six: existential threat perception;

Stage Seven: extraordinary retaliatory decisions;

Stage Eight: regional escalation.

The further the sequence progresses, the more difficult it becomes to predict the final outcome.

This is the essential danger of escalation.

13. Geographical Asymmetry

Geography is one of the most important elements of the argument.

Iran and Israel are profoundly different in territorial scale.

Iran possesses an enormous landmass extending across a major portion of the Middle East.

Israel occupies a comparatively small geographical area.

This asymmetry has strategic consequences.

A large country can possess:

• greater territorial depth;

• more space for population dispersion;

• greater geographic redundancy;

• multiple strategic regions;

• and greater opportunities for relocating critical infrastructure.

A small country possesses less geographical depth and can therefore have greater concentration of:

• population;

• infrastructure;

• economic centers;

• military installations;

• energy systems;

• and political institutions.

The difference is not merely numerical.

It affects the fundamental structure of strategic vulnerability.

14. Iran and Israel as Geographically Unequal Targets

The enormous difference in territorial scale means that the consequences of an identical number of nuclear detonations would not necessarily be geographically equivalent.

A country with enormous territorial depth and a country occupying a much smaller geographic area cannot be assumed to experience identical consequences.

This is the foundation of the argument that an attacker must consider not only its ability to strike Iran, but Iran's ability to retaliate against a much more geographically concentrated opponent.

In this context, the analogy that Israel's territory is comparable to an island relative to Iran's vast landmass illustrates the magnitude of the geographical asymmetry.

The comparison is rhetorical, but it expresses a genuine strategic concept:

territorial depth affects survivability.

15. The Regional Dimension

The argument does not stop with Israel.

A nuclear exchange involving Iran and Israel could have consequences for surrounding countries.

The Middle East contains:

• highly concentrated population centers;

• major energy infrastructure;

• international shipping routes;

• interconnected economies;

• and geographically close states.

Consequently, nuclear escalation could rapidly become regional rather than bilateral.

Radioactive fallout, population displacement, economic disruption, destruction of infrastructure, and military escalation could cross national boundaries.

The surrounding states would therefore not necessarily remain outside the conflict simply because they were not the original combatants.

16. The Possibility of Civilizational Destruction

The most severe form of the argument concerns civilization itself.

A nuclear exchange could destroy much more than military targets.

It could threaten:

• cities;

• historical institutions;

• universities;

• cultural archives;

• economic systems;

• transportation;

• communications;

• healthcare;

• food systems;

• and political institutions.

Thus, the concept of civilizational destruction should not be understood solely as the disappearance of a state from a map.

It can also mean the destruction of the institutional foundations that permit a society to maintain continuity.

Within the argument advanced here, the geographical depth of Iran creates a fundamentally different possibility for civilizational continuity compared with a much smaller and more geographically concentrated state.

17. Why the Consequences Would Also Affect the Attacker

The most important point of the argument is that nuclear warfare cannot be understood solely through the damage inflicted on the initial target.

The attacker must also consider:

What happens after the target responds?

If Iran were subjected to a nuclear attack and responded at an extreme level, the consequences could extend to the entire regional strategic environment.

Israel's small geographic scale would make it particularly vulnerable to the consequences of a major retaliatory exchange.

Neighboring countries could also be affected.

The initial attacker could therefore find itself facing consequences far beyond those anticipated when the original threat was issued.

18. The Fallacy of Assuming a Controlled Nuclear War

One of the most dangerous assumptions in strategic thinking is that nuclear warfare can necessarily be controlled once initiated.

A conventional operation can be designed around specific military objectives.

A nuclear exchange is fundamentally different.

Once nuclear weapons are used, each subsequent decision can alter:

• the scale of destruction;

• the geographical distribution of consequences;

• the political calculations of the adversary;

• and the probability of further escalation.

The attacker cannot guarantee that the conflict will end after the first strike.

Nor can it guarantee that the adversary will respond according to the attacker's preferred calculations.

19. Nuclear Threats as Strategic Self-Exposure

This leads to a central proposition:

A nuclear threat is not merely a threat against the opponent; it is also an implicit exposure of the threatening state to the consequences of escalation.

The more extreme the threatened action, the greater the potential cost if deterrence fails.

Therefore, nuclear rhetoric must be evaluated from both sides of the equation.

One cannot rationally ask only:

“How much damage can Iran suffer?”

The correct question must also be:

“What damage could the implementation of the threat ultimately bring upon the threatening state and its surrounding strategic environment?”

20. Political Propaganda and the Reality of Deterrence

This brings the discussion back to the political dimension.

If a government knows that implementing an extreme threat could produce unacceptable consequences, the threat may have greater value as rhetoric than as an operational plan.

It can be used to:

• pressure Iran;

• influence negotiations;

• intimidate political opponents;

• influence international opinion;

• strengthen domestic narratives;

• justify military spending;

• and generate economic effects.

The threat therefore becomes valuable precisely because it remains a threat.

This does not mean that every threat is empty.

It means that the political utility of the threat may be substantially greater than the utility of its execution.

21. The Economic Incentive to Maintain Tension

Persistent geopolitical tension can also create economic winners and losers.

Military industries can benefit from increased demand for:

• aircraft;

• missiles;

• air-defense systems;

• ammunition;

• surveillance systems;

• cybersecurity;

• intelligence technologies;

• and military infrastructure.

Energy markets can react to regional instability.

Financial markets can price geopolitical risk.

Insurance companies can adjust premiums.

Governments can increase security expenditure.

Consequently, the existence of a permanent threat environment can generate substantial economic activity.

This does not prove that a particular government deliberately creates conflict for economic profit.

But it demonstrates that military confrontation has an economic ecosystem surrounding it.

22. Threat Inflation

Another phenomenon relevant to the argument is threat inflation.

Threat inflation occurs when the perceived magnitude or immediacy of a threat becomes greater than the underlying evidence necessarily demonstrates.

Political systems can incentivize threat inflation because exaggerated threats can:

• generate public attention;

• justify extraordinary measures;

• strengthen political authority;

• mobilize allies;

• and support increased military budgets.

This is one reason why military rhetoric must be examined critically.

The language used by governments may describe the maximum conceivable danger rather than the most probable scenario.

23. The Importance of Iranian Military Restraint

Iran's restraint therefore becomes strategically meaningful.

If a state possesses significant retaliatory capability but does not employ the maximum possible level of force during a conflict, that restraint communicates something.

It can indicate:

• a desire to avoid unlimited escalation;

• preservation of strategic reserves;

• political calculation;

• concern for civilian populations;

• maintenance of future options;

• or deliberate signaling to the adversary.

Whatever the precise reason, restraint should not automatically be interpreted as weakness.

In strategic affairs, restraint can itself be a demonstration of power.

24. The Dangerous Misinterpretation of Restraint

However, the opposite misinterpretation can also occur.

An adversary may interpret restraint as inability.

That would be a serious strategic error if the restraint actually reflects deliberate limitation.

A state may refrain from using all of its capabilities because it wants to avoid crossing a particular threshold.

If the adversary then concludes that the state lacks greater capability, it may make increasingly aggressive calculations.

This is how deterrence can fail through misinterpretation.

25. The Meaning of the Twelve-Day War

The Twelve-Day War should therefore be understood not simply as an isolated military episode but as a demonstration of the limits of escalation.

It demonstrated that:

• Iran could be attacked directly;

• Israel could be attacked directly;

• American forces could become directly involved;

• nuclear-related facilities could become targets;

• missile warfare could occur at significant scale;

• and yet the conflict could still stop short of nuclear exchange.

The fact that the conflict eventually stopped is itself evidence that strategic limits existed.

The central question for future stability is whether those limits will continue to be respected.

26. The Strategic Significance of Nuclear Ambiguity

Israel's nuclear ambiguity introduces another layer of complexity.

Because Israel does not officially confirm its nuclear arsenal, adversaries must make calculations under uncertainty.

Iran likewise occupies a complicated position in which it possesses substantial nuclear technological capabilities but officially maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful.

This creates an environment in which assumptions can become more important than declarations.

The danger is obvious:

When states do not possess complete information about each other's capabilities and intentions, the possibility of catastrophic miscalculation increases.

27. The Problem of Absolute Confidence

No state should assume that it knows exactly how another state will react to an existential attack.

This is especially true when the adversary is a large state with substantial territory, population, military infrastructure, and strategic depth.

The assumption that:

“The opponent will respond exactly as expected”

is among the most dangerous assumptions in strategic planning.

A rational decision-maker must instead consider multiple possible responses.

28. The Strategic Meaning of an Existential Threat

Threatening the survival of a state changes the psychology of deterrence.

A government may tolerate:

• sanctions;

• conventional strikes;

• limited losses;

• or temporary military setbacks.

But an existential threat fundamentally changes the calculation.

If a state believes that its continued existence is at stake, the threshold for extraordinary measures may become dramatically lower.

This is precisely why existential threats are so dangerous.

They can remove the incentives for restraint that normally operate during limited conflicts.

29. Why Nuclear Threats Against Iran Carry Exceptional Risks

Iran's geographical scale, population, military infrastructure, energy resources, and regional position mean that a nuclear attack would not necessarily produce a simple military conclusion.

Instead, it could trigger:

• Iranian retaliation;

• regional escalation;

• attacks against strategic infrastructure;

• disruption of energy supplies;

• international intervention;

• refugee movements;

• economic shock;

• and long-term geopolitical transformation.

The result could therefore be radically different from the limited political objective originally sought by the attacker.

30. The Strategic Paradox of Destructive Power

The greater a state's destructive capability becomes, the more carefully that capability must be used.

This appears paradoxical.

A powerful state may possess extraordinary military strength, yet that same strength can make its use more dangerous because the opponent has greater reason to respond.

In a nuclear environment:

maximum capability does not necessarily mean maximum strategic freedom.

Sometimes the existence of extreme capability creates greater constraints.

31. What the Threateners Must Understand

The central message of this article can therefore be stated directly.

Those issuing nuclear threats against Iran must consider the possibility that:

1. Iran's restraint may not be unlimited;

2. Iran's full military capabilities may not have been demonstrated;

3. an existential attack could fundamentally change Iranian calculations;

4. retaliation could extend beyond the initial battlefield;

5. Israel's geographical concentration creates particular vulnerabilities;

6. surrounding states could become involved in the consequences;

7. economic and political consequences could extend globally;

8. nuclear escalation cannot be guaranteed to remain controlled;

9. the consequences could be irreversible;

10. and the political objective motivating the original threat could become meaningless once escalation begins.

The fundamental issue is therefore not whether one state possesses enough military power to threaten another.

It is whether the consequences of exercising that power can actually be controlled.

32. A Message of Strategic Rationality

The argument ultimately returns to a simple principle:

Before threatening another society with nuclear destruction, the threatening side must rationally consider what the implementation of that threat could unleash upon itself.

This is not an argument against military strength.

It is an argument for understanding the consequences of military strength.

It is not an argument that Iran is invulnerable.

It is an argument that Iran cannot be treated as though it were a geographically small, strategically isolated target with no capacity for consequential retaliation.

It is not an argument that nuclear war guarantees the survival of one civilization and the destruction of another.

It is an argument that no rational strategic calculation can safely assume that nuclear escalation will produce a clean, controlled, or predictable victory.

33. Conclusion

The severe military threats directed against Iran by the United States and Israel must be understood within a much broader political, economic, military, and strategic context.

Such threats can serve as instruments of political pressure, psychological warfare, deterrence, bargaining, domestic mobilization, market influence, and economic benefit. Their political value may in some circumstances lie precisely in their remaining threats rather than becoming military actions.

But the danger begins when rhetoric crosses into implementation.

A nuclear attack against Iran would not be an ordinary extension of conventional warfare. It could create an irreversible chain of military, political, environmental, economic, demographic, and regional consequences.

The Twelve-Day War demonstrated that direct confrontation can reach an extraordinary level while still stopping short of nuclear escalation. It also demonstrated that Iran's military response can be substantial while remaining below the maximum conceivable level of escalation.

The reported explosions near the Dimona site during that conflict add another dimension to the strategic problem: once military operations occur near nuclear-related infrastructure, the distinction between conventional warfare and nuclear-risk escalation becomes increasingly fragile.

The geographical asymmetry between Iran and Israel further complicates the calculation. Iran possesses enormous territorial depth, while Israel occupies a comparatively small and highly concentrated geographical space. A conflict involving nuclear weapons would therefore not necessarily affect the two countries symmetrically.

The fundamental strategic error would be to assume that an attack can be initiated without considering the response.

The question is not simply:

“Can Iran be attacked?”

The more important question is:

“What happens after Iran is attacked?”

And in the case of a nuclear attack, the question becomes even more serious:

“Can anyone guarantee what happens after the first nuclear weapon is used?”

No responsible strategic calculation can provide such a guarantee.

The ultimate message, therefore, is one of basic strategic rationality:

Let us understand rationally what comes out of our mouths before we say it.

Those who issue nuclear threats against the Iranian people must understand that words spoken at the level of nuclear warfare are not ordinary political rhetoric. They describe actions whose consequences could extend far beyond the intended target and could ultimately threaten the security, territory, economy, population, and political future of the very state issuing the threat.

In the nuclear age, threatening another nation with annihilation requires more than demonstrating power.

It requires understanding the consequences of one's own threat.

And that is perhaps the most fundamental principle of strategic rationality:

Before asking what an enemy will lose, a state must first ask what it itself could lose by crossing the threshold it threatens to cross.